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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 8 SUMMER, 1954 NUMBER 4
CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES
S. A. BAYITCH*
When a case having contacts with more than one country appears,
the forum will first determine whether or not to take jurisdiction. Once
this question is answered in the positive the court faces the problem of
what law to apply. Whatever course is chosen the courts will be guided
in their decisions by rules of conflict law,' or, more precisely, first by
the law concerning jurisdictional conflicts, and then by rules regulating
the "choice of law."
At present, each country establishes for itself its own conflict law.
Consequently, rules in force in different countries may lead, under the
same circumstances, to different results. Attempts to remedy this situation
have been undertaken by means of treaties. Two ways are available: first,
to eliminate the need for conflict law altogether by providing for adoption,
by the contracting countries, of uniform substantive law. Once the law
of sales is internationally uniform, for example, there will be no need
for internationally uniform conflict law concerning sales. The second
method, much less ambitious, continues the need for conflict law in view
of the still different substantive law, but aims at eliminating, or, at least,
reducing the differences in conflict law by providing for a more or less
complete set of internationally uniform conflict rules for the participating
countries.
*D.U.J., University of Ljubljana (Yugoslavia); J.D., University of Chicago Law
School; Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
The major part of the material for this article was collected by the author, in
1951 and 1952, in his capacity as a member of the staff of the University of Chicago
Comparative Law Research Center. The Director of the University of Chicago Compara-
tive Law Research Center, Professor Max Rheinstein, has consented to the use of this
material in the present article. For the content and form of this article the author is
exclusively responsible. The University of Chicago has reserved the right to make other
use of the material.
i. "Conflict law" as used here presents a shorter and, in addition, more logical
term. "Conflict of laws" may designate the fact of conflicting, not a branch of
law, unless the full form is adopted: "law of conflict of laws." I submit a term
patterned after some already accepted, as state law, treaty law, bankruptcy law, etc.,
in the hope that the appearance of the equally inaccurate term of "private international
law" is only a passing fancy [cf. 23 Procedings of the American Society of International
Law 43 (1929)1].
2. Cf. Jitta, The Development of Private International Law Through Treaties,
29 YALE L.J. 497 (1920); Makarow, Die Vereinheitlichung des Intemationalen
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Turning to the conflict law as in force in these United States, a
negative statement seems apropriate; namely, that the United States has
refrained from adhering to treaties on such uniform conflict law. This
was the attitude with regard to the European undertaking of the Hague
conferences, 3 and a similar position was taken with respect to the Codigo
Bustamante, an inter-american affair.4 Nevertheless, important areas of
conflict law as in force in this country are controlled by treaty law, and
it shall be the purpose of the present study to explore this neglected
source of our conflict law.
TrREATIES AND CONFLICr LAW
Under our constitutional system conflict law is primarily a matter
of state law. "States are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as
they choose . . . subject to . . . constitutional limitations."5  While
constitutional limitations affect state conflict law as between sister states,
state conflict law operating on the international level obtains even in
situations where such state law would "have some incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries." This power reserved to states to regulate
conflj~t law on the inter-state as well as on the inter-national level is
curtailed only by powers vested in the national government. Its legislative
powers may be exercised as to interstate conflict law (interstate commerce,
Full Faith and Credit Clause, etc.) as well as in international conflict
situations (commerce with foreign nations). The federal judiciary
will not exercise control on constitutional grounds over state created conflict
law (statutory as well as judicial) in situations involving international
conflict situations, except by enforcing treaty law, if any, as against local
conflict law. It will, however, administer federal statutory and treaty law as
well as international law, and in this context it will create its own case law.
7
The most important power of the federal government affecting conflict law
is vested in the executive branch; namely, the power of the President to make
treaties "with the advice and consent of the Senate ... provided two thirds of
the senators present concur." (Art. II, Section 2 of the Constitution).
Privatrechts dureh Staatsvertrdge, FRIEDENSWARTE 340 (1953); Tucker, The Conflict of
Laws of Laws, 3 STAN. L. REv. 388, 410 (1951); Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests:
the Federal Government and international Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102
U. OF PA. L. REv. 232 (1954).
3. K.H.N., The United States and the Hague Conferences on Private International
Law, 1 AM. J. Comp. L. 268 (1952).
4. See note 16 infra.
5. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive, 345 U.S. 515, 516 (1953).
6. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1949).
7. According to views expressed in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938),
no judicial legislation may be exercised by federal courts in areas where there is no
corresponding federal legislative power.
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This power expanded by the judicial recognition of executive agreements,8
is extremely broad, primarily because the treaty-naking power is not
limited to matters within the congressional legislative powers as listed
in Art. I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This means that by exercising
the treaty-making power the executive may create conflict law regardless of
powers reserved in this respect to states. Moreover, relying upon the treaty-
making power the executive may extend, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause (Art. I, Section 8), the legislative powers of the Congress.9
All treaty law, including law emanating from executive agreements,' 0 is
given the penetrating effect of the "supreme law of the land; and all
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding" (Art. VI of the
Constitution) ."
The question still remains to what extent, if any, the executive is limited
in the exercise of its treaty-making power by other constitutional
considerations.12  Besides constitutional requirements as to procedure,
i.e., advice of the Senate, by now almost completely obliterated by the
recognition of executive agreements as having the same dignity as
8. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941); McDougal and
Lans, Treaties and Congressional Executive or Presidential Agreements . . . , 54 YALE
L.I. 181 (1945); Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements . . . , 54 YALE L.J. 616
(1945). For recent publications, see Hill, Treaty Making Power of the United States,
a Bibliographical Guide, 9 RECORD 72 (1954).
9. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
10. With limitations as to pre-existing federal statutes, c. United States v. Guy
W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment,
Executive Agreements and Imported Potatoes, 67 I-HRv. L. REV. 281 (1953).
11. As to the law applicable in federal courts, cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1946), the
"rule of decision" referring to the "laws of the several states, except where . . .
treaties . . . otherwise require or provide ... .
12. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution as limiting the treaty-making
power in favor of Congress was invoked, without success, to show the unconsti-
tutionality of the Warsaw Convention, in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America
v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339 (S.D. N.Y. 1944), the court holding
that the "alleged conflict between the treaty and the Constitution .. . in the fact
that the treaty professes to regulate commerce, a power entrusted exclusively to
Congress" does not exist. "The Warsaw Convention, it is not disputed, was made
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate . . . .No reported decision
has been called to my attention wherein the validity of a treaty duly ratified in
the manner prescribed by the Constitution has been challenged on the ground that
it conflicts with the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce. While the
novelty of an argument is not to be taken against it, nevertheless one cannot fail
to observe the uninterrupted uniformity of the practice by which treaties of commerce,
from the earliest days of the Republic, have been made in the manner now challenged,
without arousing so much as a doubt as to the propriety of the course taken.
The broad sweep of the treaty power is in good measure reflected in the absence
of any :decision holding a treaty unconstitutional." Cf. the language used in a case
involving an executive agreement, United States v. Guy W. Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953) that "The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not
in the executive . . . and the executive may not exercise the power by entering
into executive agreements and suing in the courts for damages ...."
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treaties,' treaty law remains, of course, subject to fundamental
constitutional principles which may be changed only by constitutional
amendment. With regard to conflict law created by the exercise of the
treaty-making power, one fundamental problem arises: may the executive,
relying upon its treaty-making power, include into treaties any matter it
pleases? Phrasing the problem differently, may the treaty-making power
be exercised indiscriminately over any matter whatsoever or is it limited
to matters which are, let us say, by their very nature "international" and,
consequently, appropriate to be regulated by international agreements
between sovereign countries. In adopting the first alternative, the executive
would be authorized, as a matter of constitutional law, to take advantage
of this exceptional law-making device and enact law which may have,
at least prima facie, nothing to do with international relations, e.g.,
substantive labor law, applicable only in intra-state situations; or enact, by
treaty-making, uniform negotiable instrument conflict law, applicable not
only in inter-national but in inter-state situations as well. For a long
time the Supreme Court followed the second alternative, applying the
proper-subject test. Consistently it held that treaties may regulate "all
those subjects which in the ordinary intercourse of nations have usually
been subject to negotiations and treaty . . . ."4 Regarding treaty conflict
law, the Supreme Court held that "The treaty-making power is broad
enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations,
and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the
United States in foreign countries, and nationals of such foreign countries
within the United States, and the disposition of property of aliens dying
within the territory of the respective parties, is within the scope of that
power, and conflicting law of the state must yield.' 5  Under this proper-
subject test only treaty law concerned with inter-national situations would
have the effect granted to treaties under the Supremacy Clause. The
test would, consequently, exclude from this privilege treaty law regulating
mere inter-state or intra-state situations. This latter result, however, has
never been reached by the Supreme Court since in all cases it was found
that the particular treaty passed the proper-subject test.'0
13. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
14. GCeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890).
15. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
16. In spite of the liberal attitude adopted by the Supreme Court, the executive,
especially the Department of State, always acted cautiously. A few examples relating
to conflict law shall suffice. In 1851, the presidential message submitting the treaty
with Switzerland to the Senate declared that regulations concerning holding of land
by aliens "is not supposed to be a power properly to be exercised by the President
and the Senate in concluding and ratifying a treaty with a foreign state. The authority
naturally belongs to the state within whose limits the land may lay" [5 MILLER,
'TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF TIHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
881 (1937)]. The underlying idea was taken up by J. Cardozo in his elaborate opinion
In re D'Adamo's Estate, 212 N.Y. 214, 106 N.E. 81, 85 (1914), by stating that the
executive has no power to establish by treaties rules concerning the administration of
CONFLICT LAW IN U. S. TREATIES
At the present time, however, this strict rule seems to be relaxed
in favor of a more flexible test. At first, the Supreme Court only indicated
that "no subject is expressly excluded by the Constitution from treaty
negotiation nor any type or form of convention. It is not, in the second
estate left by aliens. "Each state, under our system, has exclusive jurisdiction over
the administration of property of persons, whether foreigners or citizens dying within
its limits." This reasoning was later declined by the Supreme Court in Santovincenzo
v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); it seems to be still lingering on; cf. Amaya v. Stanolid
Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 808, 867 (1946).
Equally noticeable is the care not to compromise by treaty our constitutional
principles. The treaties with Italy (1878, Art. IV), with Yugoslavia (1881, Art. IV)
and with Greece (t902, Art. IV) contain, in connection with testimony to be given
by consuls, the express proviso that "Nothing in the foregoing part of this Article
. . . shall be construed to conflict with the provision of the sixth article of the
amendments to the Constitution of the United States or with like provisions in the
Constitutions of the several states, whereby the right is secured to persons charged
with crimes, to obtain witnesses in their favor, and to be confronted with the
witnesses against ,them." To this unilateral reservation in favor of a privilege of an
American citizen under the Constitutions (federal and state) the treaties with Italy
and Yugoslavia add that such treatment according to the American standards "shall
also be granted to the consuls of the United States" in the receiving country.
It may be added that some of our constitutional standards, like the Due Process
and the Full Faith and Credit, penetrated into the language of some treaties: the
first appears, e.g., in the treaty with Germany (1923, Art. 1), with China (1946, Art.
VI, 4), etc. and the second, at least the term, was introduced into the treaty with
China with respect to arbitration agreements. As to the problems involved, cf.
Wilson, Propery-Protection Provisions in United States Treaties, 45 AM. J. INr'L L.
83, 99 (1951) and The International Law Standards in Treaties of the United States
(1953).
In both the treaty of Versailles [treaty of Berlin, 1921, 42 STAT. 1939, cf.
Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles and After, Annotations of the Text of
the Treaty (1947)] and the treaties of peace of Paris (1947), the United States
expressly declined to adhere to provisions concerning matters of contract law, statute
of limitations, negotiable instruments, insurance, including some conflict rules, by
stating (Art. 299c of the treaty of Versailles) that "Having regard to the provisions
of the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America .. . neither the
present Article . . . shall apply." A similar position was taken in the treaty of
peace with Italy (1947, 61 STAT. 1648, Annex XVI, part D, 2): "Having regard
to the legal system of the United States .. . the provisions of this Annex shall not
apply as between the United States ... and Italy." The recent peace treaty with
Japan [1951, cf. Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan 421 (1951)1 contains similar provisions like the
Paris treaties in a separate protocol not signed by the United States.
The same attitude prevailed with regard to the Codigo Bustamente on inter-american
conflict law, adopted by the Sixth International Conference of American States in
Havana (1928). Cf. Lorenzen, The Pan American Code of Private International
Law, 4 TULANE L. REV. 499, 519 (1930); Bustamante, The American System on the
Conflict of Laws and Their Reconciliation, 5 TULANE L. REV. 537 (1931); also Kuhn,
Opinion of the Inter-American Judicial Commission on Revision of the Bustamante Code,
40 Am. J. INT'L. L. 317 (1952). The United States delegation considered itself
unable to approve the Code "in view of the Constitution of the United States ...
the relation among the States members of the Union and the powers and functions
of the Federal government." 111e problem was discussed by the American Society
of International Law [Proceedings, vol. 33, 36 (1929)]. It was emphasized that
the above declaration does not represent a "constitutional non-possumus" (37), but
only pointed out "certain difficulties in the way of commitments by the United States
to certain principles of private international law." "We must recognize," stated one
member "that our Federal government ...will not, as a practical matter, undertake
to do things which might conceivably be controversial" (39), recognizing, at the same
time, that "reserved powers of states are not such limitations" (40).
Note the Convention for the formation of codes of public and private international
law, adopted by the Second International Conference of American States (Mexico, 1902)
signed by the United States but not ratified.
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place, clear that any such restriction is to be inferred from the Con-
stitution.' 17 This negative statement, going beyond the proper-subject test,
was implemented later by a new, positive test: treaties and executive
agreements will be given the law-of-the-land effect according to the
Constitution provided they are "clearly necessary to effectuate national
policy."'is  According to this doctrine anything may be negotiated
and settled by treaties or executive agreements, whether the subject-matter
be of inter-national, inter-state or intra-state nature, provided it is justified
by necessities of our "national policy." The Supreme Court went even
so far as to say that the exercise of the treaty-making power is not
subject to judicial control, on the ground that "the conduct of foreign
relations (is) committed by the Constitution to the political department of
the Federal Government and the property of the exercise of that power
is not open to judicial inquiry.' 91
This shift in attitude as experienced in a decade is justified,20
if not dictated, by fundamental changes in the methods and objectives
of international cooperation. Today, international cooperation between
countries is not limited to problems of regulating specific privileges to be
granted nationals of the other country in a rather limited number of
inter-national situations. On the contrary, it has developed into a world
wide legislative program designed to create uniform world law in areas
where the demand for security, welfare and happiness, individual as well
as national, is most articulate: in labor law,21' in human rights,22  in
international trade,23 in land reform,2' 4 in health,25 etc. By now no country
may safely withhold its cooperation. As for the United States, the question
to be or not to be a member of an active international community, is
already decided by its membership in several world organizations2 6 whose
aims include, among others, preparation and adoption of internationally
17. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
18. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
19. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937).
20. Cf. Comment, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 400 (1953).
21. Cf. International Labour Office, IrNT'L LASOUR CODE 1951 (1952); also
note 28 infra.
22. Hyman, Constitutional Aspects of the Covenant, 14 LAw & CONT. PR. 451
(1949); MeDougal-Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community . . . id.
at 490; Chaffee, Federal and State Powers under the United Nations Covenant on
Human Rights, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 389; Claudy, The Treaty Power and Human
Rights, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 389 (1951); Claudy, The Treaty Power and Human Rights,
36 CORnELL L.Q. 699 (1951); MacChesney, International Protection of Human Rights
in the United Nations 47 N.W.U.L. REV. 198 (1952).
23. Cf. MIKESELL, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1952); ALFXANDROWICZ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS (1953).
24. Lubin, Land Reform Problem Challenges Free 'World, 25 DEP'T. STATE BULL.
467 (1951).
25. Sharp, The New World Health Organization 41 AM. J. iNr'L L. 509 (1947).
26. Cf. Jenks, The Impact of International Organizations of Public and Private
Intmntional Law, 37 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOCIETY 29 (1951); ALLEN, Tim
TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LEcISLATION (1952).
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uniform law. One of them, the Organization of American States,2 7 is
expressly authorized to "promote the development and codification of
public and private international law," i.e., conflict law, and, also "to study
the possibility of attaining uniformity in the legislation of the various
American countries, insofar as it may appear desirable." (Art. 67 of
the Bogota Charter, 1948, 2 UST 2395). It is to be kept in mind, however,
that in all these undertakings such internationally uniform law is to be
adopted by countries according to their own constitutional law. 28 20
II
AP'LICA'ON 0' '1'REA-'y LAW
Even if granted the authority of the "law of the land," treaty law
does not apply as does statutory law. Its application is limited since
it controls, as a rule, only situations within the specific coverage provisions
contained in the respective treaty, e.g., because nationals of the contracting
countries are involved.3 0
27. Fenwick, The Charter of the Organization of American States as the "Law
of the Land," 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 281 (1953).
28. The United Nations may make to its members recommendations for various
types of international cooperation, e.g., economic, social, cultural, etc. (Art. 13, 1 of
the Charter); the Economic and Social Council may "prepare draft conventions for
submission to the General Assembly" (Art. 62, 3). More articulate is the Constitution
of the Food and Agricultural Organization (59 STAT. 529) authorized to make
recommendations to be submitted to member states "with a view to their acceptance
by the appropriate constitutional procedure" (Art. 14, 3). Similarly, UNESCO
submits recommendations to "competent authorities" of its member-states (Art. IV 4).
Elaborate provisions, taking into consideration even specific problems facing federal
states, are contained in the Constitution of the International Labor Organization
(Art. 17, 49 STAT. 2713); cf. Hudson, The Mermbership of the United States in the
nternational Labor Organization, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 669, (1934); Reilly, Ratification
of International Labor Conventions, 18 B.U.L. REV. 579, (1938); Riesman, The
American Constitution and International Labor Organizations, 44 INT'L LABOR REV.
123 (1941); DILLON, INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS, TInEIR INTERPRETATION AND
REVISION (1942). On the contrary, a limited regnlation-making power is
conferred upon the Health Assembly (W.H.O., Art. 21, 22, 62 STAT. 2679)
but was blocked by a well aimed reservation (joint Resolution, June 14, 1948,
62 STAT. 411). As to the International Civil Aviation Organization, see Fuller,
International Civil Aviation Organization . . . . 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 86 (1952)
and Lissitzin, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation, 17
J. AIR. L. 436 (1950). Cf. Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems of International
Organizations, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 11, 47 (1945) and PARKER, Tims AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORDER BASED ON LAW (1953).
29. The adoption of Art. 2 of the Bricker amendment [S.J. Res. 1, 30 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 195 (1954)] containing the now famous "which-clause," aimed at
eliminating, with respect to treaties, the effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause
would make it necessary to check every conflict rule contained in a treaty against the
legislative powers of the Congress (without the benefit of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, of course) and of the several states. In view of the sometimes overlapping powers,
it might be necessary to enact congressional legislation as well as seek state legislative
action with respect to one treaty, even to one treaty provision.
30. Statements like, "it will suffice to say that treaty has no application to
the private conduct of individual citizens of the United States," Rice v. Sioux City
Memorial Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 1953), and "We do not
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As a rule, bilateral treaties control situations where nationals of both,
or, at least, of one of the contracting countries are involved. An example
of the latter situation is presented by the treaty with Germany (1923,
Art. IV) making treaty law applicable in situations where the deceased was
a national of either contracting country regardless of the nationality of
the beneficiary.3 The same rule is adopted in the treaty with Italy
(1948, Art. V, 3) providing that it applies to "heirs, legatees, donees
being persons of whatever nationality" as long as the deceased was a
national of one of the contracting countries. Similar methods are used
in determining the applicability of treaty law concerning consular notarial
functions: consular officials may act in this capacity provided at least one
of the parties involved is a national of their country. In some cases,
however, the fact that third country nationals are involved makes treaty
law inapplicable. A treaty with Belgium (1880, Art. XII) declares consular
officials without authority to settle sea damages in cases where third
country nationals are involved, and the case remains with local authorities.
In some treaties the applicability of their rules is made dependent
upon reciprocity,3 e.g., under the treaty with Italy (1948, Art. VII, 7)
granting equal national treatment with respect to interest in land. It
may suffice to note that the question of whether such reciprocity is formal
or factual is left in most cases to interpretation. In some instances
reciprocity is imposed unilaterally.3 In addition, it seems that our courts
are inclined to read into treaties the requirement of reciprocity
4
In determining the coverage of multilateral treaties different contacts
are used. One of them, of course, is nationality of the countries signatory
of such treaties. This contact, however, was reduced, e.g., in the Convention
for the protection of industrial property (1934, 53 Stat. 1748), with respect
to nationals of countries not signatories to the Convention, provided they
are domiciled within a member country (Art. 3), to a mere "real and
effective industrial or commercial establishment in the territory of any
of the countries" signatory35 (Art. 3). Nationals of member-countries, on
the other hand, may enjoy privileges under the Convention in another
member-country regardless of their domicile or establishment, since the
understand to be the principle of law that a treaty between sovereign nations is
applicable to the contractual rights between citizens of the United States when a
determination of these rights is sought in the state courts," Sipes v, MecGhee, 316
Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) are justified only in situations where treaties
create exclusive rights and duties between countries or between international entities,
e.g., the United Nations, and its member states, etc.
31. Cf. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
32. Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function: A Problem of Conflict of Laws, Constitutional
Law, and International Law. 15 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 44 (1953).
33. 13 STAT. 121, 22 U.S.C. § 256, ss. (1946).
34. Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912), but see In re Lis' Estate,
Austro-Hungarian Consul v. Westphal, 120 Minn. 122, 139 N.\V. 300, 306 (1912).
35. Similar methods have been adopted by the lnterrAmerican Treaty on patents
of inventions, etc. (Mexico, 1902, not signed by the United States); ef. LADAs, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 757 (1930).
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"possession of domicile or establishment in the country where protection
is claimed" cannot be required by local authorities. Another objective
contact is used in air transporation: to make the Warsaw Convention
on international transportation by air (1929, 49 Stat. 3000) applicable
the flight must have originated in a signatory country and be "international"
(Art. 1, 2). A similar criterion, i.e., employment of a specific kind, is
used in most of the conventions adopted by the International Labor
Conference (e.g., 54 Stat. 1683, 1693, 1705), some of them expressly
stating that the conventions apply regardless of the nationality of the
worker involved. 86
III
DESICNATION OF TnE LAW APPLICABLE
Ordinarily, conflict rules designate the controlling legal system by
pointing out the contact to be followed, e.g., the place of making of a
contract, the place where the tort occurred, etc. This technique is
adopted, naturally, in most of our treaties dealing with conflict situationsY7
A special problem, however, arises where there is more than one legal
system in force within the country whose law is declared applicable.
Generally, treaties do not elaborate on this point. In some treaties, a
routine reference is used, a reference to the "applicable law of either High
Contracting Party" (treaty with Italy, 1948, Art. II, 1). Consequently,
the law applicable will be ascertained according to the internal conflict
law of the respective country referred to, i.e., not only by its inter-state
conflict law but also according to rules regulating conflicts between federal
and state law. Nevertheless, some treaties contain specific provisions, especial-
ly in situations where the determination of such internally applicable law has
36. As to the problem of rights vested under treaty law, cf. Chae Chan Pring
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889): "The rights and interests created by a treaty,
which have become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will not destroy or
impair them, are such as are connected with and lie in property, capable of sale
and transfer or other disposition, not such as are personal and untransferable in
their character"; cf. also Chirae v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U.S. 1817).
37. Regarding the designation of the subiect-matter of a conflict rule, treaties
frequently use notions developed by international law, e.g., commerce or trade, Tashiro
v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236, 256 Pac. 545 (1927), aff'd, 278 U.S. 123; Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923); Petersen v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170 (1917); Duns v.
Brown, 245 U.S. 167 (1917); Cornelius v. Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 Pac. 17 (1923);
Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1917); commerce and industry, Lukich v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 29 P.2d 388 (1934); property, Dobrin v. Mallory
S.S., 298 Fed. 349 (E.D. N.Y. 1924); protection and security for persons and property,
Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. People of the State of New York,
239 U.S. 193 (1915).
Contacts as used in treaties do not differ from those in municipal law; territorial
(e.g., lex situs in Art. I, § 7 of the treaty with Thailand, 1937; location of personal
property in the treaty with Sweden, 1910, Art. XIV, locus delicti in Art. II of the
treaty with Liberia, 1938, etc.). Personal contacts include, of course, nationality,
domicile, religion, also quasi-nationality of corporations and things (vessels, aircraft).
The contact established by parties choice of law is mentioned in Art. 32 of the Warsaw
Convention (1929).
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immediate effect upon privileges to be granted under the treaty by the
other contracting country. To cope with this problem, treaties introduce
a new contact in addition to nationality, the contact which makes treaty
law applicable in the first place. This. auxiliary contact, the contact of
domicile or incorporation, will determine, in addition to the principle
of the reciprocal national treatment (see infra V), what legal standard
will have to be matched by the other contracting country. This method
is now being used in many treaties; for example, under the treaty with
Italy (1948), an American national will be entitled to invoke, with
regard to interests in real property in Italy, only such rights as are "accorded
by the state . . . of the United States in which such national is domiciled,
or under the laws of which such corporation . , . is created or organized,
to nationals ...of the Italian Republic" (Art. VII, b, 1). A similar
technique is adopted in the treaties with China (1946, Art. VIIT, 1),
with Uruguay (1951, Art. VII, 2), with Israel (1951, Art. IX, 2).
In some of the treaties the law applicable is not deviously indicated
by way of contacts, but by directly naming the country, the law of which
shall apply. According to the treaty with Iran (1928, 47 Stat. 2652) all
non-Moslem, United States nationals are subject in Iran, as to their
personal status, to their own national law and Iranian courts "would be
obligated to apply American law." Similarly, the Costa Rican labor code
is expressly declared applicable in the Agreement respecting temporary
migration of Costa Rican agricultural workers (1944, Art. II, a, 1, 59 Stat.
1275). The Agreement with Mexico concerning migratory workers (1943,
57 Stat. 1158) went one step further. It not only declared Art. 29 of
the Mexican (federal) labor law to apply, but even incorporated it
verbatim into the Agreement. A similar method was followed in the
now expired Convention regarding the abolition of the capitulations. in
Egypt (Montreux, 1937, 53 Stat. 1645) where the Egyptian R gltement
d'organisation judiciaire referred to by the Convention (Art. 3) is annexed
in full.
Similarly, the law applicable is designated in the Agreement with
Great Britain concerning the Bahamas long range proving ground (1950,
TIAS 2099, 1 UST 545). The Agreement provides, in accord with the
lex loci damni doctrine, that compensation to be paid by the government
of the United States "shall not be less than the sum payable under the
laws of the Bahama Islands" (Art. XXII), adding, moreover, that the
compensation affecting private property "shall be assessed in accordance
with the law of the Bahama Islands" (Art. XXII, 2). In this connection
an interesting inter-temporal provision may be noted. While, according
to a generally accepted conflict rule, a reference to the law applicable
means a reference to the law as in force according to its own inter-temporal
provisions, the Agreement introduced a freezing provision that "for the
purpose of this Article the laws of the Bahama Islands shall be the laws
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in force at the time of the signature of this Agreement, provided that any
subsequent alteration of the said laws shall have effect if the Contracting
Parties so agree" (Art. XXII, 3).38
Some treaties contain, of course, a mere status-quo provision, as, for
example, the Agreement with Canada concerning leased areas in Goose
Bay (1952, TIAS 2730) where the United States recognizes that "the
laws of Canada shall continue to apply" throughout the area involved
(Art. 17).
Finally, it is to be noted that some treaties refer in a general way to
international law as controlling.39 The Provisional Agreement with Iran
(1928, 47 Stat. 2644) for example, provides that the treatment of nationals
shall be governed by the "requirements and practices of generally
recognized international law" (Art. 1, 3). The same rule appears, moreover,
in some recent treaties, e.g., with Thailand (1937, Art. I, 6), Yemen (1946,
TIAS 1535), Nepal (1947, TIAS 1585), China (1946, Art. VI), Ireland
(1950, Art. II), etc., as to the protection of persons and property. There
can be no doubt that international law so referred to as controlling includes
also conflict law applicable in private, especially jurisdictional and status
matters. This seems to be indicated by the Judicial Agreement between
Great Britain and Iraq (1922) recognized by the United States (47 Stat.
1844) where, in connection with a general reference to international law
as applicable, the Agreement contains the following provision: "In
matters relating to personal status of foreigners or other matters of civil
and commercial nature in which it is customary by international law to
apply the law of the country, such law shall be applied in a manner
to be prescribed by law .... " (Art. 4).40
IV
TREATIES AND LocaL LAw
Treaties dealing with conflict problems presume, in most instances,
that there is municipal conflict law in force in the contracting countries.
38. These provisions are repeated in the additional Agreement (1952, TIAS 2426)
with respect to the Turks and Caicos Islands (Art. XXV, 2).
A similar agreement with the Domincan Republic (1951, TIAS 2425) is less
explicit; it contains an undertaking by the United States to pay adequate compensation
for injuries (Art. IX) without any reference to local law. This law is affected as to
such claims by a freezing provision regarding "laws of the Dominican Republic which
would derogate or prejudice any of the rights" under the Agreement (Art. XXIV, 2).
39. WILSON, TiE INTERNATIONAL LAw STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES 89 (1953); cf. Stevenson, Relationship of Private International Law to Public
International Law, 52 COL. L. REv. 561 (1952).
40. "In questions of marriage, divorce, maintenance, dowry, guardianship of
infants and succession of movable property, the President of the Court . . . may
invite the consular representative . . . of the foreigner concerned to sit as an expert
for the purpose of advising upon personal law concerned." Ibid.
According to Art. I of the Judicial Agreement "foreigners" refers to any European
or national of American states who formerly benefited by capitulations in Turkey and
did not renounce such privileges before July 24, 1923, i.e., before the Lausanne treaty
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The question arises, however, as to what extent such local law will be
superseded by treaty law. In a general way it may be said that the obvious
intent of treaties is to eliminate contrary local law completely. Never-
theless, in many instances local law, including conflict law, survives due
to express treaty provisions.
Local law is being referred to by treaties in two different ways and,
accordingly, with different effect to be given to such references. One,
a mere reference is intended to be a declaration to the effect that treaty
law shall be tied in with local law as it stands, wherever treaty law
should be effectuated. rhp other is a reservation in favor of local law denying
treaty law any effect upon local law.
1. Reference to local law.-A mere reference to local law in a treaty
makes it clear that rights and privileges under a treaty may be enjoyed
according to general rules contained in the local law. The question
whether such privileges may be enjoyed remains with the treaty and is in
no way affected by local law.
The privilege of "free access to courts,"" is usually accompanied by
such a reference to local law. The clause that such access will be granted
"in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations, if any" (e.g.,
treaty with China, 1946, Art. VI, 4) does not make the privilege dependent
upon the local law, but intends to state that the access itself, the "how,"
shall be determined by local procedural law, e.g., appearance, jurisdiction,
venue, procedure.42 This is expressly pointed out in the Convention
for the protection of industrial property (1934, 53 Stat. 1748) granting,
within the coverage of the Convention, national treament also with regard
to "legal remedies against any infringement . . . provided they (i.e.,
claimants) observe the conditions and formalities imposed on subjects or
citizens" (Art. 2, 1). This reference is clarified in paragraph 3 of Art. 2
that "provisions . . . relative to judicial and administrative proceedings
and competent authority . ., are expressly reserved."
A mere reference to local law is used frequently in connection with
the privilege of commercial intercourse which is granted, in most treaties,
"subject to general laws and usages of the two countries" (treaty with
Argentina, 1852, Art. II) or upon "submitting to all local laws and regulations
duly established" (treaty with El Salvador, 1926, Art. I). Likewise, the
protection of property and persons is accorded "upon conforming with
the laws and regulations, if any" (treaty with China, 1946, Art. VI, 3).
[2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CIIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES, 867 (1947); Turlington, The Settlement of Lausanne, 18 AM. J. INT'L L.
696 (1924); Turlington, Treaty Relations with Turkey, 35 YALE L.J. 326, 337 (1925)].
41. See infra VII, 1.
42. In Wyers v. Arnold, 147 SV.2d 644 (1941), cart. denied, 313 U.S. 380, it
was held that under the reference "on conforming to the local law" (treaty with
Germany, 1923, Art. I, 44 STAT. 2132) the local rule barring probate of will after the
lapse of one year remains applicable.
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2. Reservation in favor of local law.-Since the very purpose of a
treaty is to unify the law in both contracting countries, treaty law will super.
sede local law except where there is an express reservation to the contrary.
One of the reasons for such reservations is the fact that in multi-legal
countries certain matters are considered to be without the treaty-making
power of the national government, or at least it is felt to be politically
unwise to intrude into such areas. In other cases certain local rules are
valuated so high that they must not yield to treaty law. In some
instances the reservation represents a compromise between the two contract-
ing countries, one of them able to fight off the invasion of treaty law and
the other unwilling or unable to do so. These considerations account
for the fact that a layman, in the sense of a non-diplomat, will find it
rather difficult to grasp the real sense of such reservations, especially
where they are unilateral. He will read, in one line, a neat and laudable
principle of law, while in the next line, he will find it emasculated by a
well aimed reservation. Even courts are puzzled by such diplomatic "double-
talk;" incapable of "double-think," or unwilling to approve of it, they refuse
to give effect to such carefully drawn legal artifices.
4 3
As already indicated, reservations in favor of local law may be of two
different types. One, the mutual reservation grants both contracting
countries the privilege to keep in force their local law even if contrary
to the treaty.4" Another type is the unilateral reservation affecting only
one country and leaving the other with its local law unimpaired. Such
limping treaty law relates mostly to interests in real property. Typical in
this respect is Art. VII of the treaty with France (1853, 10 Stat. 992)
providing that "In all the states of the Union where existing laws permit
it .. .Frenchmen shall enjoy the rights of possessing real property . . .
as the citizens of the United States." On the other hand, France undertook
the obligation to accord American nationals "the same rights within its
territory in respect to real and personal property and inheritance, as are
enjoyed by its own citizens," reserving the "ulterior rights of establishing
reciprocity" while the United States promised to "recommend passage
43. Cf. the language in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 269 (1890): "To
construe the first clause as providing that Frenchmen shall enjoy the rights of
possessing personal and real property by the same title and in the same manner as
citizens . . . so long as their laws permit such enjoyment, is to give a meaning
to the article by which nothing is conferred not already possessed, and leaves no
adequate reason for concession by French . . . made in the third clause. We do not
think this construction admissible." Cf. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FII.NCII PRIVA'E
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1953); Applicetion and Interpretation of Treaties by the
Internal Courts in Franco-Arnerican Relations, 80 1. DRoIT rrINT'L 584 (1953).
44. Among recent treaties, the treaty with China (1946) abounds with far
reaching reservations in favor of local law. Similar elaborate reservations are contained
in the consular convention with Great Britain (1951).
An interesting reservation is to be found in the convention between the United
States, Great Britain and Iraq (1930, 47 STAT. 1817) formulated as follows: "Subject
to the provisions of any local laws for the maintenance of public order and public
morale, and to any general educational requirements prescribed by law in Iraq, the
nationals of the United States will be permitted ..." (Art. 4).
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of such laws as may be necessary of conferring this right," i.e., to hold
interests in land.
Another area where the reservation in favor of local law appears
frequently, is treaty law on devohtion upon death of real property. It
is a common feature in our treaties that the right of aliens to inherit
real property is limited wherever the applicable local law (i.e., lex situs)
contains discriminatory provisions. Treaties uphold, as a rule, such local
law, offering, at the same time, another alternative by providing that if
such property would pass a national of the other contracting country were
he not disqualified because of his alienage "by the laws of the country
where such property is situated," he is granted, under treaty law, the
privilege to liquidate the interests involved and take proceeds out of the
country (e.g., treaty with Great Britain, 1899, Art. I,45 also with other
members of the British Commonwealth; with Guatemala, 1901, Art. I;
Germany, 1923, Art. I),46 Reservations in favor of local law concerning
interests in chattels are rather rare. In some recent treaties, however, the
general rule guaranteeing free ownership, inheritance and disposition of
movable property is qualified by the following reservation in favor of local
law, ie., as to "direct or indirect ownership by aliens or foreign corporations
. ..of shares in, or instruments of indebtedness of, corporations . . .
carrying on particular types of activities" (treaty with China, 1946, Art.
VIII, 4; with Italy, 1948, Art. VII).
Reservations in favor of local law appear, most frequently, with respect
to doing business by foreign corporations, or, more precisely, their "right
to exercise any of their functions" within the other country, declaring
these privileges to be "governed by the laws and regulations, national,
state or province, which are or may hereafter be established within the
territories of the Party wherein they propose to engage in business"
(e.g., treaty with El Salvador, 1926, Art. XIII; with Austria, 1928, Art. X,
with Norway, 1928, Art. XIII). The recognition of the legal existence
of such corporations alone does not include the privilege "to transact its
business or industry in the other (country), this permission remaining
always subject to the regulations in this respect existing in the latter
country" (e.g., treaty with Russia, 1904, Art. 3).
An area where the effect of such reservations was frequently litigated
45. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1920), involving this treaty provision, was
decided on the ground that, at the time of the devolution, Canada had not vet
adopted the convention, and, consequently, "the law of Kansas was not superseded
in favor of British subjects in Canada" (443). It may be added that even if Canada
had adopted the convention, local laws of Kansas would still survive because of the
reservation.
46. Cf. Haucnstein v. Lyncham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) interpreting Art. V, 3 of
the treaty with Switzerland (1850/55) to override local law in spite of a reservation
in the treaty that the provision as to free devolution of real property "shall be applicable
to real estate within the States . .. in which foreigners shall be entitled to hold or
inherit real estate"; see also State ex Tel. Tanner v. Stacheli, 97 Or. 572, 192 Pac. 911
(1920).
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in courts concerns the privilege granted to consular officials to administer
estates of their nationals. The privilege is granted, in many instances,
subject to an express reservation that "the laws of the place where the
estate is administered, so permit" (e.g., treaty with Germany, 1923, Art.
XXIV). Consequently it was held by our courts that persons entitled
under local law to be appointed administrators "have not been divested
by the treaty."47 The reservation worded "so far as the laws of each country
will permit" (treaty with Sweden, 1910, Art. 14) invoked by the Italian
consul under the most-favored-nation clause (Art. 17 of the treaty with
Italy, 1878) was interpreted 48 to mean that "both rights, the right of
temporary intervention and the right of permanent administration granted
in addition" are conditioned upon local law, since the reservation in its
favor does not refer "only to special administration but as well to the
last clause of the treaty providing for general administration."'
Finally, a reservation relating to matters of jurisdiction should be
mentioned. Consular jurisdiction in seamens' disputes is, in many treaties,
conditioned upon local law and consular officials are granted the privilege
to exercise such jurisdiction "provided that local law permits" (e.g., treaty
with Norway, 1928, Art. XXII: with El Salvador, 1926, Art. XXI; with
Cuba, 1926, Art. XlI; with the Philippines, 1947, Art. XI, etc.). A similar
provision but referring to the actual taking jurisdiction by local authorities,
is inserted in the recent consular treaty with Great Britain (1951, TIAS
2949) granting such jurisdiction "provided the judicial authorities of the
territory do not take jurisdiction in accord with tile provisions of Art. 23"
(Art. 22, 3) 0
47. Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 16 A.2d 961 (1940).
48. In re D'Adamo's Estate, 212 N.Y. 214, 106 N.E. 81 (1914).
49. The problem of consular administration will be discussed later.
50. Difficulties in drafting and interpreting reservations will best be illustrated by
the 1850/55 treaty with Switzerland (11 STAT. 587, 18 STAT. 748). 'rhe treaty as
signed in 1850 adopted the principle of "reciprocal equality" [5 MILLER. TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS . . . 876 (1937)] with a qualification that such
equality shall be understood to mean the internal foreigner treatment (see infra V)
granting Americans in Switzerland the treatment enjoyed by Swiss citizens "originating
in or belonging to other Cantons of the Confederation," and, vice versa, Swiss citizens
in the United States a treatment as accorded to "citizens of the United States born
or belonging to other States of the Union." The presidential message to the
Senate (1851, 5 MILLER, O p. Cit. 881) expressed doubts as to the rule with respect
to interests in land (note 16, supra). Subsequently, the Senate deleted, among
others, par. 2 and 3 of Art. I involved, whereupon Switzerland submitted a new
proposal (5 MI.LER, Op. cit. 883). It retained the principle of "reciprocal equality,"
but added, in order to meet American objections, a stronger worded reservation in
favor of local law, namely ", . . where such admission and treatment shall not
conflict with the constitutional or legal provisions, as well as Federal and State and
Cantonal, of the contracting parties." The treaty, in its final form (1855) adopted
a reservation making the enjoyment of treaty privileges "subject to the constitutional
and legal provisions aforesaid and yielding obedience to the laws, regulations and
usages of the country wherein they reside . . . ," and inserting, moreover, in the
same Art. I a restrictive reference to Art. V with regard to real property "as explained
in Art. V" where a full reservation in favor of local law is contained. So it
happened that in trying to clarify the general principle of Art. I as to real property,




In designating the law to be applied, treaties often utilize one or
another of the standards developed in international law. One of them,
important in conflict law, is the equal national treatment, or, in short,
the national treatment. Such treatment grants treaty aliens the privilege
that the same law be locally applied as if they were nationals of the
country.5 ' As a consequence, the contact of alienage will be disregarded
out with a double and general reservation in favor of local law. This latter
reservation, however, seems to be inconsistent with the language in some of the
following articles of the treaty which remained, apparently, unaffected by the trouble
centerina around Art. V. These provisions have been taken over from the 1850
text without changes and grant, without reservations, e.g., free access to courts "in
the same manner as native citizens," equality of fiscal burdens like "citizens of
the country where they reside," indemnities in case of expropriation, etc. In view
of all this it is not surprising to find that courts are unable to reach consistent
results. Two Swiss cases are significant. In Instant Index Corporation v. Tribunal
of the Canton of Vand, BCE 60 1 220 (1934) the Federal Tribunal held that the
reservation in favor of local law as contained in Art. I does not make local law
requesting an American corporation to post the cautio judicatum solvi inapplicable,
even if the court considers the 1855 amendments to be "d'ordre redactionel."
In a later case [Wolfe v. Frei, BCE 76 I 111 (1950)] the same court held that
"the significance of a reservation in favor of local law . . . is not clear . . .
nevertheless such reservation cannot be construed as granting Cantons the right
to worsen the position of American citizens by legislation since in such way the equality
of treatment of American and Swiss nationals as guaranteed by the treaty would become
illusory" and decided that "the law of the Cantons may treat American nationals less
favorable than their own citizens only insofar as such treatment of citizens of other
Cantons would be upheld under federal law" (120).
It may be added, regarding Wolfe v. Frei, that objections by the United States,
mentioned above and referred to in the opinion, did not aim at obtaining "eine
weitergehende Cleichstellung" (Italics by court) since the President of the Swiss
Federation assumed that the removal of par. 2 and 3 of Art. I (1850) has "probably
for its purpose the reservation of certain exceptions made in respect of foreigners
or those not citizens of the States of the Union by the different constitutions
and laws of these States" (5 MILLER, OP. Cit. 886). "Difficulties arising out of
this provision" continues the opinion, "have been removed by deleting this paragraph
(i.e., par. 2 of Art. 1) and revising Art. I. It follows from par. 3 of Art. I
that an American national shall have within a Canton at least the position of a
citizen of another Canton since the only exception to the general principle of equal
treatment-apart from political rights reserved to citizens-concerns the participation
in the property of municipalities, communities and foundations unavailable to citizens
of other Cantons according to par. 4 of Art. 43 of the Federal Constitution. See
also note 56 infra.
Cf. Nussbaum, American-Swis Private International Law, 47 COL. L. REv. 186,
188 (1947); Huber. The Intercantonal Law of Switzerland (Swiss Interstate Law),
3 Am. J, INT'L L. 62 (1909).
51. Recent treaties contain a definition of the term "national treatment"
meaning "treatment accorded within the territories of a High Contracting Party upon
terms no less favorable that the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to
nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of such
Party" (Art. XIX, I of the treaty with Uruguay, 1949). This rule is qualified in
the treaty with Greece (1951) to the effect that the term does not "imply immunity
from the laws and regulations of a Party which apply, in a non.discriminatory manner
to nationals, companies . . ." (Art. XXIV, 1).
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and the law applicable to the country's owii citizens will controlP2
In a general way, the national treatment is adopted by the Inter-
American Convention concerning the status of aliens (Havana, 1928,
46 Stat. 2753) providing that "states should extend to foreigners, domiciled
or in transit through their territory, all individual guarantees extended to
their own nationals and the enjoyment of essential civil rights without
detriment, as regards foreigners, to legal provisions governing the scope
and usages for the exercise of said rights and guarantees" (Art. 5). National
treatment with respect to commerciurn in the sense of the rights to "enter,
travel and sojourn," to engage in various, mostly enumerated activities,
is a permanent feature of our treaties of friendship and commerce.
Specifically, the national treatment is granted with respect to protection
of persons and property (treaty with France, 1853, Art. 7), and only
exceptionally (treaty with Argentina, 1853, Art. IX) or with reservations,
(treaty with Ireland, 1950, Art. VII) regarding to real property (Art.
VIII, 4, 6, of the treaty with Uruguay, 1949). In some recent treaties
national treatment is accorded regarding compulsory insurance (treaty
with Uruguay, Art. III, 2; with Ireland, 1950, Art. IV, 2, etc.), access
to courts (e.g., with Uruguay, 1949, Art. V, 1, c; with Ireland, 1950, Art.
VI, 1, c; see also infra VII, 1), organization of corporations "controlled
by nationals and companies of either Party and created or organized under
the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of the other
Party" (Art. VI, 2 of the treaty with Ireland, 1950); as to expropriation
(e.g., Art. II, 2 of the treaty with Switzerland 1850/55; Art. VIII, 2 of
the treaty with Uruguay, 1949; Art. VI, 5 of the treaty with Denmark
1951); as to functions and powers of notaries public (Art. IX of the
Protocol on uniformity of powers of attorney, 1941, 56 Stat. 1376); and
claims based on death or injury (e.g., Art. III of the treaty with Germany,
1923; Art. III of the treaty with Uruguay, 1949, etc).'
Multilateral treaties also accord national treatment to nationals of
signatory countries, e.g., the Convention for the protection of industrial
property (1934) providing that they "shall enjoy . . . all the advantages
which arc granted or which may later be granted to nationals . .
(Art. 3).54
In multi-legal countries the question arises as to what law is to
52. For a comprehensive list of subjects and treaties, see GIBsoN, ALIENS AND
THE lw 165 (1940); cf. also Cutler, The Treatment of Foreigners, 27 Am . J.
INT'L. L. 225 (1933).
53. In re Romari's Estate, 191 Cal. 740, 218 Pac. 421 (1923) the provision of
the California Civil Code (See. 672) establishing a five year period to bar alien
claims against estates was held to conflict with Art. 7 of the treaty with France
(1853) providing that "Frenchmen shall enjoy . . . in the same manner as the
citizens of the United States."
54. Cf. Roubier, Le Droit Unioniste de la Propriete Industrielle, 78 CLUNET
676, 714 (1951).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
be applied under the national treatment clause, federal, state or both.
'The argument may be advanced that aliens may be granted privileges
only insofar as such privileges are within the federal legislative power.
This position, however, is untenable as to the United States in view of
the treaty-making power being independent from the national legislative
powers. It was held in Tashiro v. Jordanz55  that "there is nothing
in the language of the treaty (with Japan, Art. 11, 1911) to indicate
that the words 'native citizens' were employed in any limited sense."
Conscquently, the court construed the national treatment clause "to extend
to such foreign subjects all the rights that the native citizen enjoyed
irrespective of the source of such rights." Recent treaties, moreover, contain,
in connection with national treatment, an express provision to the effect
that every type of law in force in the respective country shall apply,
as for example in the treaty with Austria (1928, Art. II, 47 Stat. 1876),
where national treatment with respect to "civil liability for injuries or
death" includes privileges "as granted by National, State or Provincial
laws."
An indiscriminate extension to aliens of privileges enjoyed by nationals
may lead to startling results, namely that nationals of the same country,
being citizens of some other political subdivision thereof (e.g., of another
State), let us call them internal foreigners, will be worse off than treaty
aliens. It is therefore understandable, that, since the Swiss 1850/55 treaty,56
our international agreements have adopted more and more a qualified
type of the national treatment, at least unilaterally with respect to the
United States. In these treaties the clause according national treatment
is to be understood as to confer upon treaty aliens the treatment given
by States to internal foreigners, i.e., to citizens of sister-states or to
corporations incorporated therein. This type of a qualified national
treatment is now formulated (e.g., in Art. III, 3 of the treaty with China)
as to corporations in the sense that the language "on the same terms" will
be construed to mean "such rights and privileges, iii any state of the
United States of America, upon the same . . . accorded therein to
corporations . . . created or organized in other states . . . of the United
States." Similar provisions are to be found in treaties with Italy (1918,
55. 201 Cal. 236, 256 Pac. 545, 549 (1927), aff'd on other grounds, 278 U.S.
123 (1928).
56. The original reciprocal national treatment as contained in the 1850 text of
the treaty (note 50 sulpra) still seems to be lingering on in Swiss courts. In In re
Michel, BGE 23 1 490 (1897) the Federal 'ribunal started from the principle of
national treatment as laid down in the 1850 text, even if qualified with a reservation
in favor of local law, but held that "it follows (from Art. l)'that Michel being
a national of the United States of America is entitled in Switzerland to a treatment
like a Swiss citizen, and that his deposit located in Chur may be taxed by the
Canton . . . only if a similarly located deposit of a Swiss citizen who dies in this
Canton and was domiciled in another Canton .. .would be subiect to the taxing
power of the former Canton." Cf. also Wolfe v. Frei, BCE 76 1 111 (1950).
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Art. II, 3), with Greece (1952, Art. XXIV, 4), with Denmark, (1951, Art.
XXII, 4) and with Israel (1951, Art. XXII, 4).-Y
The idea of such "internal foreigner treatment" is at the bottom of
the provision contained in the treaty with Greece (1951, Art. VI)
concerning the enforcement of arbitral awiards. In general, the treaty
accords such awards what amounts to national treatment since they "shall
be entitlcd to privileges . . . pertaining to awards rendered locally." 'his
rule, however, is qualified iisofar as the United States is concerned, by
the understanding that "awards rendered outside of the United States
of America shall be entitled in any court in any State thereof only to
the same measure of recognition as awards rendered in other States
thereof."
Finally, it may be added that the national treatment clause is not
always adopted in its pure form. In many treaties it appears subject to
qualifications, e.g., reciprocity (treaty with Switzerland, 1850/55, see note
50) or is combined with the most-favored nation treatment.
VJ
Mos'r-FAvoaEINATION TRLEATAFNT
While the national treatment extends the applicability of local law
otherwise applicable only to nationals, to treaty aliens, the most-favored-
nation clause8 makes applicable to treaty aliens provisions of a treaty
entered into with a third country. Accordingly, such treaty applies, on
the one band, within its original area of coverage, i.e., between both
countries parties to the treaty, and, on the other hand, it may apply
to nationals of a country not party to such treaty, on the basis of the
most-favored-nation clause. This clause, consequently, entitles nationals
of the country so favored to invoke, with respect to matters governed by
the clause, any provision of any treaty entered into by the other contracting
country dealing with the same matter. 9
57. T1hcre is an analogous equal alien treatment, according to Art. 1, 3 of the
treaty with Austria (1928), also Art. IX, 3 of the treaty with Denmark (1951),
as to interests in land which shall be granted "subject to reciprocity" as accorded
"to foreigners by the laws of the place where the property is situated." Likewise,
according to Annex XIV to the peace treaty with Italy (1947) property rights of
Italian nationals resident in ceded territories shall be subject "only to such legislation
as may be enacted from time to time regarding the property of foreign nationals
and juridical persons generally" (9).
58. Ilornbeck, The Most.Favored Nation Clause, 3 Am. J. INT'L L. 295 (1909);
Washburn, The American Interpretation of the Most-Favored Nation Clause, I VA.
L. REV. 257 (1913); Lunwic, CoNsuLAR TREATY RicuTs AND COMMEN'TS ON TIlE
MOsT-FAVoRnD NATION CLAuSE (1913); SNYDER, THE MOsT-FAVORED NArION
CLAUSE (1948); Schwarzenberger, The Most-Favored Nation Standard in British State
Practice, 22 BaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96 (1945). Cf. 5 tIAcKwoRTIr, D I ST . . . 269
(1943).
59. Recent treaties define the clause as meaning "treatment accorded within the
territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded
therein, in like situations to nationals . . . of any other country" (e.g., treaty with
Ireland, 1950, Art. XXI, 2).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
It is obvious that the clause applies only with respect to matters
specified in the treaty granting the most-favored-nation treatment.10 There
must be, of course, a treaty entered into by either contracting country,
available for such secondary application. The question whether or not
such possibility exists, does not, as a matter of principle, affect the
operation of the clause. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the conditional
most-favored-nation clause brings this aspect into focus.
The doctrine of the conditional most-favored-nation clause developed,
it seems, under the impact of the idea of consideration. Tle rule of a
quid-pro-quo is considered to apply also in situations where treaty provisions
invoked under the clause are contained in another treaty and it appears
as if the necessary consideration was given elsewhere. In such a situation,
it is reasoned that the country required to grant such privileges may
inquire, before according them, whether or not the country invoking
such privileges under the clause can show a consideration equal to the
one contained in the original treaty. At a glance, it may be
noted that the most-favored-nation clause was bargained for and con-
sideration may be shown by the very existence of the treaty granting it.
In addition to this, it is quite difficult to determine the amount (and nature)
of a consideration given in the original treaty in view of the fact that
such treaty, as a rule, does not contain just one, but a number of mutually
interconnected privileges. Such straight notion of the clause proved un-
workable in almost all situations where such consideration could not be
isolated. Consequently, the clause was changed into one requiring
reciprocity.6 1  This means that a privilege may be invoked under
the clause provided the country (or its national) invoking it is
able to show that it grants, according to its own law or under a treaty
with a third country amenable to the clause, to the invoking country (or
its nationals) the same privilege as is sought to be enforced under the
clause. Finally, the doctrine of the conditional most-favored-nation clause
was abandoned altogether,62 starting with the treaty with Germany (1923)63
as to commercial matters and, then, introduced as a general rule in the
60. Cf. Lukich v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, supra; In re Clausen's Estate,
202 Cal. 267, 258 Pac. 1094 (1927) holding that the clause contained in a
commercial treaty with Denmark (1826) did not cover consular administration of
estates under the treaty with Germany. In Dobrin v. Mallory S.S. Co., 298 Fed.
349 (2d Cir. 1924) the clause of the treaty with Great Britain concerning property
(1899, 1902) did not support plaintiff's claim to recover upon the death of a relative.
f. National Provincial Bank v. Dollfus (Cour d'Appel, Paris, July 9, 1947), noted
in 2 INT'L L.Q. 267 (1948) and in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 188 (1949).
61. Cf. Santovinceuzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1941); Rocca v. Thompson, 223
U.S. 323 (1911); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1920); also 5 l-IAcKwoRTH,
DieEsT . . . 274.
62. The unconditional clause was expressly agreed even earlier, e.g., in the
treaty with Yugoslavia (1881, Art. IV): "It is understood that every favor or
exemption which shall be subsequently granted in this matter to the subiects of a
foreign country by one of the two contracting powers shall be immediately and by
right extended to the citizens or subiects of the other party."
63. Cf. John 1'. Bill Co. . United States, 104 F.2d 67 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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treaty with Italy (1948). In the latter it is declared, with proper emphasis,
that the treaty is "based in general upon the principles of the
most-favored-nation treatment in the unconditional form" (preamble).
Nevertheless, the conditional doctrine may still apply under previous
treaties.
The most-favored-nation clause is used, in our treaties, mostly in
connection with commerce, especially customs, taxes of different kind,
etc. There is, however, quite an impressive list of situations where the
clause applies in matters closely connected with conflict law. In many
treaties, the clause determines the law applicable with respect to
establishment and sojourn (e.g., treaty with Turkey, 1931, Art. I; with
Greece, 1936, Art. I); regarding the protection of persons and rights
(treaty with Nepal, 1947; with Italy, 1948, Art. V); with regard to the
personal status of Iranians in the United States (treaty with Iran, 1923);
legal status of juridical entities (treaty with Rumania, 1930, Art. I); as
to the organization and participation in such entities (treaty with China,
Art. IV, 1; with Italy, 1938, Art. 1II, 1). The clause applies with respect
to interests in real property (treaty with Sweden, 1910, Art. XIV, 5; with
China, Art. VIII, 1); relating to personal property (treaty with China,
1946, Art. VIII, 5), or both (treaty with Yugoslavia, 1881, Art. II, 1, and
under the Agreement of 1948, Art. 504; with Great Britain under the
treaty of 1899, etc.). The clause applies in cases of nationalization (treaty
with Italy, 1948, Art. V, 3); trade-marks (see infra); as to jurisdiction in
general (treaty with Ethiopia, 1914); "judicial competence" (treaty with
Turkey, 1931, Art. 1) and some specific aspects thereof, as for example,
free access to courts (treaty with Thailand, 1937, Art. 4); representation
in courts (treaty with Spain, 1902, Art. VI), and searches (treaty with
Italy, 1948, Art. VI). The following matters are, moreover, subject to
the clause: administration of estates by consular officials (e.g., treaty with
Greece, 1912, Art. XII, 2); consular privileges in general (treaty with Italy,
1787, Art. XVII; with Saudi Arabia, 1933, Art. I; with Liberia, 1938, Art. I;
with the Philippines, 1947, Art. 1). It applies as to controls of international
payments (treaty with China, Art. VIII, 4; with Italy, 1948, Art. XVII, 3);
as to the protection of copyright, etc."15 It is, finally, quite common to
determine the treatment to be given imported goods (treaty with
Switzerland, 1936, Art. I; with Guatemala, 1936, Art. I).
In some treaties the most-favored-nation clause is combined with
the national treatment, e.g., according to the treaty with Thailand (1937
Art. IV) where access to courts is granted "equally with the nationals
of the state of residence and with nationals of the most favored nation."
64. 19 DEPT. STATE BULL. 137 (1948).
65. Cf. Garcia, El Derecho de Autor ante la Clausula de la Naci6n Mas
Favorecida, 12 REVLSTA COL. ABOc. 437 (Buenos Aires 1933); Los Tratados y
Convenciones Internacionales sobre Propriedad Literaria . . . I DERECHOS DE
AUTHOR 11, 19 (1946).
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A similar provision is also contained in the treaty with China (1948
Art. V, 4); the effect of such combination being that, in addition to
the national treatment, the most-favored-nation clause will make available
privileges not granted to the country's own nationals but, under treaties,
to nationals of some other countries.
VII
CONFLICt OF JURISDICTIONS
The extent to which independent countries may exercise their judicial
powers 6 is determined, in principle, by the idea of sovereignty. "Ti
jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation
as an independent sovereign power," and, consequently, "is susceptible of
no limitations not imposed by itself."67 Such consent may be expressed
by treaties or by rules of self-limitation contained in municipal law in
view of the co-existence of other "distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence." This accounts for a "relaxation of that
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers."' 8  'flie doctrine is restated in the Inter-Americaii
Convention on rights and duties of states (1938, 49 Stat. 3097) recognizing
every country as having the right to "define the jurisdiction and competence
of its courts" subject to no other limitations that "the exercise of the
rights of other states according to international law" (Art. 3), and, of course,
treaties6 1
Access to courts.-To what extent, if at all, international law requires
a country to keep its courts open to aliens, is controversial. In the United
States aliens have not been denied the privilege of appearing in courts as
parties litigant. In many countries, however, such privilege is not granted
and in order to guarantee the privilege to its nationals, the United States
has frequently resorted to treaties.70
66. Cf. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign judgment, 41 Cot. L. REV. 221
(1941); Beale, The jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 IARv. L. REv. 241 (1923);
S ruYT, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS TO
DISPUTES ON ATTRIBUTION AND EXERCISE OF STATE JURISDICTION (1946); NEuNERI,
INTERNATIONALE ZUSTANDICREIT (1922); RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSREcIT
(1949); Perassi, Nore Convenzionali sulIa Cornpetenza Ciurisdi:ionale a Norma
Interne sulla Competenza Internazionale, 21 ANNuARiO DIRITTO COMPARATO 1 (1946);
MORELLI, DIRITTO PROCESS1rALE CiVI.E INTERlNAZIONALE 73 (1938); Pagenstecher,
Gerichtsbarkeit und Internationale Zulstandigkeit als Selbstandige Prozessvoraussetzungen,
11 RABEI.S ZTSCHR. 337 (1937); Goldschnidt. Jltisdiccion lnernacional, 5 REVISTA
ESPANOIA DERECIO INTERNACIONAL 163 (1952).
67. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Craneh 116, 136 (U.S. 1812).
68. Ibid.
69. The problem how to delimit judicial jurisdiction also appears in the draft
declaration on the rights and duties of states (adopted by the General Assembly
of the U.N. in 1949, YEARnOOK Or TilE U.N. 1948/9, 948) disregarding the
distinction between the legislative and judicial jurisdiction (Art. 2).
70. See the exhaustive discussion by Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in
United States Connercial Treaties, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1953). Also Beale,
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'fhe present trend in treaties, as well as in municipal law, is toward
granting aliens in court a non-discriminatory treatment. The Inter-
American Convention on the status of aliens (Havana, 1928, 46 Stat. 2753)
formulates the rule by providing that "Foreigners are subject as arc
nationals to local jurisdiction and laws, due consideration given to the
limitations expressed in conventions and treaties" (Art. 2). ihe same rule
is repeated in the Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota,
1948, 2 UST 2394): "The jurisdiction of states within the limits of their
national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants whether
nationals or aliens" (Art. 12).
71
The "free access to courts" privilege is intended to guarantee aliens
the right to apear in courts as a party litigant like any other party in
the same place and under like circumstances,7" without granting them
any preferential treatment over that prescribed by the lex fori generally.
The right of such treaty aliens "to sue are governed by settled practice
and procedure so long as not unequal or injustly discriminatory. The
right to appear in courts implies a right to prosecute or defend a cause
of action upon the same terms as accorded to others. Such appearance
must be subject to decisions by the courts upon the general principles of
law by which they are guided in deciding causes presented through the
appearance of other parties equally favored." Consequently, the court
complied with the "free access" privilege when "the contentions have been
decided according to general principles of law governing the rights of all
litigants similarly situated."
73
In treaties "free access" is accorded most often under the national
treatment clause (e.g., with Bolivia, 1858, Art. 13; Costa Rica, 1851, Art.
VII; Chile, 1832, Art. X and additional 1833 treaty; Switzerland, 1850/55,
Art. 1; Ireland, 1950, Art. VI, 1, c). In some treaties the most-favored
Jurisdiction over Foreigners, 26 HARV. L. Rev. 283 (1913), and Pillet, Jurisdiction
in Actions Between Foreigners, 18 HARv. L. REv. 325 (1905); cf. PAEPE, ETUDES
SUR LA COMPETENCE CIVILE A L'ECARD DES ETRANCERS (1900).
71. The American Declaration of the rights and duties of man [Bogotl, 1948,
43 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 133, (1949)] provides that "Every person may resort
to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights . . ." while the U.N. Declaration
(1948, ibid. 127) seems to be more explicit by providing that "Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law" (Art. 8). Cf. 3
NovENA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA (Bogota, 1948), AcTAs Y
DOCuMENTUS 186 ss. (1953).
72. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
73. Universal Adiustment Corp. v. Mittand Bank Ltd., 281 Mass 303, 184
N.E. 152, 163 (1933). Consequently, it was held that the application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine was not precluded by the "free access" privilege.
In the recent Ambatielos case (May 19, 1953, .C.J. Reports 1953, 10) the
dissenting opinion pointed out that the "free access" "has as its purpose the removal,
for its beneficiaries, of the obstructions which existed in certain countries as the
result of old traditions, to the right of foreigners to have recourse to the courts.
Its obiect is . . . to ensure free access to the courts, not to regulate the different
questions of the production of evidence . . . . Free access to the courts is One
thing: the proper administration of justice another", the latter meaning "alleging
a violation of general international law" (33, 34).
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nation clause is used (e.g., with China, 1946, Art. VI, 4; Italy, 1948, Art.
V, 4) even combined with the national treatment (e.g., Denmark, 1951,
Art. V; Israel, 1951, Art. V, etc.) or with reciprocity added (Yugoslavia,
1881, Art. IV, 3). Moreover, some treaties settle a few specific questions
involved. A few state that the "free access" privilege applies not only
to courts but includes "administrative tribunals and agencies, ili all degrees
of jurisdiction" as well (e.g., Uruguay, 1949, Art. V, I, c; Denmark, Art.
V, 1). Some treaties deal with the question of counsel (e.g., Italy, 1948,
Art. V, 4), with the right of parties to be present wherever such presence
is allowed under the lax fori (e.g., Bolivia, 1858, Art. XIII); some treaties
go into the problem of the cautio actoris.
74
The "free access" privilege is accompanied, as a rule, by a reference
to local law ("conforming to the laws regulating the matter", e.g., treaty
with Germany, 1923, Art. XII; El Salvador, 1926, Art. XII; Finland, 1934,
Art. XVI). A special limitation is introduced in the treaty with Israel
(1951) that "free access" does not "obligate" the contracting countries to
"entertain an action where a decree of dissolution of marriage is sought
by an alien" (Protocol 2), probably a reservation in favor of local law.
The right of alien legal entities (e.g., associations, corporations, etc.)
to appear in courts of the other country is complicated by a preliminary
problem: whether or not courts will recognize their legal existence. While
older treaties failed to mention specifically legal entities when granting
the "free access" privilege, recent treaties expressly deal with this problem.
74. The question whether the "free access" privilege includes also an exemption
from giving security for costs and judgment and the right to free legal aid, is answered
in treaties in different ways. The treaty with Esthonia (1925) denies it (Protocol 1)
subjecting Esthonians in the United States to the equal alien treatment. As to
American nationals in Esthonia, it is "understood that inasmuch as in the United
States the privileges of this character are regulated largely by the laws of several
States, nationals of the United States domiciled in States which accord such
exemptions . . . to nationals of Esthonia freely or on the basis of reciprocity
shall be accorded the exemptions . . .authorized by Esthonian law." It is interesting
to note that the situation of aliens in federal courts was not taken into consideration
(Cf. B 1915, Tit. 28 U.S.C. and 3 HAcXwoRTru, DiGEST ... 570).
A contrary rule is adopted by the treaty with Denmark (1951, Protocol 1);
Israel (1952, Protocol 1); the treaty with Greece (1951, Art. XXIV, 5) grants the
privileges on the national and most-favored-nation basis.
The privilege of "free access" regarding corporations is considered by the treaty
with Ireland (1951) providing that either country retains the power "to order a
company ... suing or applying to it, to give security for costs where such company
fails to show that it has substantial available and sufficient assets within the
jurisdiction of such court" (Protocol 4).
A French court sustained defendant's motion for the cautio judicium solvi
against an American plaintiff pointing out that there is no treaty in force dispensing
with it (July 19, 1926, J. DROIT INT'L 656, 1927). Cf. French Legal Aid is Not
for Americans, It BRIEF CASE 3 (1953) and DELAUME, AMERIcAN-FRENCH PRIVATE
INT'L LAW 30 (1953).
Jordan, Clause du Libre Acces et Libre et facile Access, 3 LAPRA ELLE-NiBOYET,
REPERTOIRE DROIT INT'L 513; Caution Judicatum solvi, id. at 167; Kosler, Freies
Gericht und Sicherheitsleistung fiir Prozesskosten im Internatinalen Reehte, 59 J.W.
1802 (1930); Richter, Die Klausel des freien und unbedingten Zutritis zu den Gerichten
in internationalen Staatsvertrdgen, DEuTscHE JOU. ZTG. 309 (1928); Philonenko,
La Caution Judicatun solvi en Droit Francais Modern, 56CLUNET 609, 896 (1929).
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Often, both provisions are contained in the same article; the standard
formula as used between 1923 and 1945 reads as follows:
Limited liability and other corporations, whether or not for
pecuniary profit, which have been or may hereafter be organized
in accordance with and under the laws, National, State or
Provincial, of either High Contracting Party and maintain a central
office within the territories thereof, shall have their judicial status
recognized . . . .They shall enjoy free access to the courts of
law and equity, on conforming to the laws regulating the matter ....
(Germany, 1923, Art. XII).5
According to this provision, copied by a number of treaties entered into
during this period, the recognition of the existence of a legal entity is
conditioned not only upon the fact that such entity is incorporated in
the other contracting country but also that it maintains there a central
office. The clause, "They shall enjoy free access . . ." leaves us with
the impression that the "free access" privilege will not be granted to
entities with no such "central office" within the country of incorporation.
Some of the recent treaties restrict considerably the enjoyment of
privileges granted to legal entities incorporated in the other country but
controlled by third country nationals. Such restrictions, however, do not
affect the privilege under the treaties, of "free access" to courts. 7
Whether a legal entity, in order to qualify for the "free access"
privilege, must be locally registered (domesticated) depends, in absence
of a specific treaty provision, upon the lex fori.7  Treaties, however, tend
to dispense with such a requirement. The Inter-American Declaration on
the juridical personality of foreign companies (1939, TS 973) states
that companies have the right "to enter appearances in the courts
as plaintiffs and defendants", adding an express reference to local law
that "they comply with the laws of the country." The Declaration being
only a statement of the law as it is in force in the signatory countries
75. In Eskimo Pie v. Margarinewerk Dr. A. Seb., A.G. the German Reichsgerieht
(June 3, 1927, 117 R.G.Z. 215) discussed the capacity of a Delaware corporation
to sue in a German court. The question was decided according to the law of Delaware
(Art. 1, 1 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code), disregarding the
controlling Art. XII of the treaty with the United States.
76. According to the treaty with Uruguay (1949, Art. XXI, 1, e) both contracting
countries may deny the advantages of the treaty to any "company, even though it may
have the nationality of the other Party, as long as ownership or direction of the
company is controlled by nationals or companies of a third country. However, the
provisions of the present treaty relating to the juridical status of foreign companies
and their appearance in court, are exempted from the limiting provisions of the present
paragraph" (also treaty with Greece, 1951, Art. XXIII, 1, f; Israel, 1951, Art. XXI,
1, e; Denmark, 1951, Art. XX, 1, f; Ireland, 1951, Art. XX, 1, f., etc.).
77. batty, International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations, 29 Micn. L.
Rzv. 28 (1930). State law denying corporations incorporated abroad, access to
state courts [which prohibition may even be, in diversity cases, binding upon federal
courts, Woods v, Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949)] "as long as such
corporations fail to comply" with local requirements of registration (e.g., FLA. STAT. §
613.07) will prevail in all cases where there is no treaty law to the contrary since no
constitutional problem of undue burden on inter-state commerce is involved [as, e.g.,
in Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914) etc.].
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was not intended to supersede local law; nevertheless, the United States
signed the Declaration with the undcrstanding that companies "shall be
permitted to sue or defend suits of any kind without the requirement
of registration or domestication." On the contrary, an express dispensation
with local registration is to be found in the treaty with Italy (1948, Art.
V, 4) granting corporations and associations "not engaged in business
or in nonprofit (sic) activities" "free access" to courts "without any
requirement of registration or domestication." The treaty with China
(1946, Art. VI, 4) introduced a new feature, namely the non-existence
of a permanent establishment, branch or agency, within the territory of
the other contracting country, i.e., where the corporation is not incorporated.
Only such corporations may apear in court without going through local
registration; nevertheless, they are required to file "at any time prior to
appearance . . . reasonable particulars" as prescribed by local law. This
provision recently has been rewritten so that local registration as a
prerequisite for the "access to court" does not apply to corporations "not
engaged in activities within the territories of the other Party" (treaty with
Ireland, 1951, Protocol 5).
Similar problems arise with regard to international organizations, e.g.,
the United Nations and their specialized agencies. Without going into
details which are better discussed outside of this study, it may be said
that the United Nations enjoys "such capacity as may be necessary . . ."
for the performance of its functions (Art. 104 of the Charter). The
International Labor Organization has, according to its Constitution
(Art. 39) the capacity to "institute legal proceedings," as have other
specialized agencies of the United Nations. These treaty privileges arc,
in addition, implemented by municipal law.78
Judicial iurisdiction.-Conflicts involving the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction on the inter-national level may be, by means of treaties, settled
in different ways. The most articulate method is to regulate, by mutual
agreement between countries, the extent of their respective judicial powers.
There are also other methods aimed at solving, at least partially, the same
problem, one of them being to authorize, by treaty, consular officials on
duty in a foreign country to take cognizance of certain classes of disputes
between their own nationals. Another way is to create quasi-judicial bodies
(e.g., international commissions) to try and adjudicate disputes between
nationals of both contracting countries. Finally, treaties may encourage
private arbitration of such disputes.
Treaties delimiting judicial jurisdiction as between countries are by
no means common. Most countries rely, in this respect, on general rules
78. For a compilation, see I ZEYTEL, ENABLING INSTRUIMENTS OF MEMBERS OF
TIE UNITED NATIONS (1951), esp. the International Organizations Immunities Act
(59 STAT. 669), Art. 2. Cf. Balfour v. United States, 90 F. Snpp. 831 (N.D. Cal.
1950); International Refugee Organization v. Republic, 92 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1950),
189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951).
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of international law in addition to their municipal law; nevertheless, there
are a few treaties in point.
(a) A peculiar provision survived in our treaty with Switzerland
(1850/55) providing that:
Any controversy that may arise among claimants to the same
succession, as to whom the property shall belong, shall be decided
according to the laws and by the judge of the country in which
the property is situated (Art. VI).
This provision, quite common in the past,7 0 was litigated once in
Switzerland'" and once in the United Statcs.8t  It contains two simple
conflict rules: one designating the law applicable as to inheritance claims
(to be discussed later) and the other settling the questions of judicial
jurisdiction in the sense that such jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the
forum rei sitae.8
2
(b) A different type of jurisdictional delimitation by treaty is contained
in the Warsaw Convention. Here plaintiff is given the choice of several
jurisdictions in which to bring his action on claims arising from international
79. E.g., treaties with Prussia, 1828, Art. XIV, Austria, 1829, Art. IX; Wurtenberg,
1844, Art. V, also with Haiti, 1864, Art. 9, etc.
80. In re Wohlwend (November 24. 1883, BGE 9 507) decedent died in
Illinois leaving a savings account in a Swiss Bank. The Swiss Federal Tribunal
assumed that "at the time of the signing of the treaty by the contracting countries,
they were . . . in accord as to movable property so that by using the words 'judge
and laws of the land where the property is situated' they did not mean 'judges and
laws' of the country where the individual pieces of the estate arc located in fact,
but 'judges and laws' of the last domicile of the deceased where such pieces are
considered to be situated on the basis of a legal fiction, i.e., mobilia ossibus inherent"(516. But see note 82 infra.
8l1 In re Schneider's Estate, 928 N.Y. 852, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1950). For a
discussion, see Falconbridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 VAND. L. REv.
708, 725 (1953).
82. It is to be kept in mind that an identical provision was contained already
in the previous treaty with Switzerland (1847, Art. I if.; cf. 5 MILLER, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs ... 169). Negotiating the 1850 treaty, Swiss representatives
attempted unsuccessfully to replace this provision with one patterned after their draft
convention with France (Art. 7) that "Difficulties relative to inheritance shall be
judged by the courts of the country where they are opened" (cf. MILLER, Op. cit. 183).
This proposal [cf. PILLET, LEs CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALEs RELATIVES A LA
COMPTENCE JUDICEARE VT A L'EXECUTION DES JUvcElMENTS, 145, 353 (1913)] was
rejected by the American negotiator, as evidenced by the Swiss message mentioned
note 50 supra, explaining that "either in the United States it is not permissible
for a judge to render an opinion according to other laws than those of tile country,
or, because . . . the same court may be called upon to judge a dispute under
the laws of two or three countries." These supposed grounds for the attitude of
the American negotiator against changing Art. VI may not be in point as to
American law, but they prove nevertheless that there was no change in the American
determination not to change Art. VI. Finally, for fear expressed in the same
message, that Swiss insistence upon such change might bring about "some unforeseen
obstacle in the United States Senate", Swiss negotiators gave in and Art. VI was
adopted without changes.
It is to be added that the doctrine underlying Art. VI is only the time honored
Statutist rule "tot hereditates quot patrimonia diversis terrtoiis obnoxia;" cf. 2 LAINE,
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE CONTENANT UNE ETUDE HISTORIQUE
ET CRITIQUE DE LA TIEORIE DES STATUTS . . . 285 (1892); DELAUME, LES CONFLITS
DE Lois A LmA ILLS n CODE Civil. 315 (1947).
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air transportation: the air carrier's domicile, his principal place of business,
the location of his agency through which the particular contract has been
concluded, and the place of destination (Art. 28). The first three contacts
follow the civil law rule of actor sequitor forum rei while the last relies on
the contact of the place of performance. It may be added that the
place of injury as designating the forum was rejected.8 3
(c) A third group relates to disputes arising out of trade-mark
infringements. According to the Inter-American Convention for trade-mark
and commercial protection (Washington, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907) jurisdiction
is vested in courts of the place where such infringement occurred, granting
the owner of a protected trade-mark "the right to employ all legal means,
procedure or recourse provided in the country in which such interferring
mark is being used or where its registration or deposit is being sought",
with the routine reference to local law (Art. 7). 84 Older treaties, on the
contrary, are less explicit on this point. According to the treaties with
France (1869), Belgium (1875), Yugoslavia (1881), etc., claims of this
nature are to be "prosecuted . . . in courts of the country in which the
counterfeit shall be proven as if the plaintiff were a subject of that
country."
(d) An elaborate set of rules delimiting jurisdiction is contained in
the Agreement between the parties to the NATO regarding the status of
their forces (London, 1951, TIAS 2846). Jurisdiction over claims against
members of the armed forces and their civilian components for damages
"in the territory of the receiving State to third parties" arising out of their
performance of official duties (other than contractual claims) shall be
settled according to a scheme prescribed by Art. VIII, 5 of the Agreement.
Claims arising out of torts not connected with official duties will be dealt
with by the "authorities of the receiving State" and "nothing in this
paragraph shall affect the jursdiction of the courts of the receiving State
to entertain an action against a member of a force . . . unless and until
there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim" (Art. VIII, 6, d)
which rule applies also in cases of "the unauthorized use of any vehicle of the
armed services . . . except in so far as the force of civilian component is
legally responsible" (Art. VIII, 7). Local jurisdiction regarding contractual
claims is not affected at all.
(e) Finally, some treaties touch upon the parties' determination of
judicial jurisdiction, prorogation.8 5  One provision falling into this group
was contained in the now expired Montreux Convention (1931) concerning
83. GOEDlUIs, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATION AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 287
(1937; cf. Rotterdansche Bank v. B.O.A. Corp., 1 All E.R. 675 (1953).
84. The prior Santiago Convention (1923, 44 STAT. 2494) formulated the rule
to read that "in any civil, criminal or administrative proceedings arising in a country
with respect to marks . . . the domestic authorities of the same State have jurisdiction
thereof, and the percepts of the law and procedure shall be observed" (Art. V, 1).
85. Cf. Graveson, Choice of Law and Choice of Jurisdiction in the English
Conflict of Laws, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1951, 273 (1952).
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capitulations in Egypt. There, an option was given foreigners to elect
local courts by entering into an express agreement by means of a clause
"attributing competence", or, by the mere fact that such foreigner has
instituted proceedings before a local court or has not challenged its
jurisdiction in due time, or, with regard to legal entities, by inserting into
their charters a clause attributing judicial jurisdiction to Egyptian courts.
A provision limiting the choice by parties of judicial jurisdiction is contained
in the Warsaw Convention (1929) declaring without effect "all special
agreements . . . by which parties purport to infringe the rules laid down
by this Convention . . . by altering the rules as to jurisdiction" (Art. 32). 6
Note: The present study will be continued in the next issue of the Miami Law
Quarterly and will discuss, among others, problems concerning judicial procedure, torts,
contracts, property, family law, legal entities, devolution upon death, administration
of decedent estates and general problems (e.g., characterization, renvoi, etc.).
86. Among recent drafts the Rome Convention on damages by foreign aircraft
to third parties on the surface (1952, 2 INT'L & Coip. L.Q. 94, 1953) vests exclusive
jurisdiction in the court of the locus damni, and giving at the same time parties
a chance to take "action before the courts of any other Contracting State" which
proceedings will not prejudice parties litigating in the forum loci damni." In addition,
parties may agree to arbitrate "in any Contracting State" (Art. 20). Cf. Davis,
Surface Damage by Foreign Aircraft, the United States and the New Convention, 38
CORNELL L.Q. 570, 586 (1953).
Cf. Colclaser, Jurisdiction in Private Air Law Cases, 49 Micu. L. REV. 1163 (1951).
The Draft for a uniform law of the international sale of personal property
(Provisional Draft of Buenos Aires, 1953) contains an express provision similar to
the one adopted by the above Rome draft. Disputes arising out of international
sales of chattels (as defined by Art. 1, par. 2 of the Draft) shall be adjudicated by
"judges and courts of the place of performance of the obligation" (Art. 22), though
this place is not defined by the Draft. In addition, parties may "by mutual consent
stipulate the judges, courts or arbitrators as some other place." The rule giving
exclusive jurisdiction to courts of the place of performance is contrary to basic
jurisdictional principles of our law and will make the acceptance of the convention
rather difficult. It seems advisable to eliminate all jurisdictional provisions except
those relating to arbitration, and stay with substantive rules.
